The Axiom of Choice and the Class of Hyperarithmetic Functions  by Kreisel, G.
MATHEMATICS 
THE AXIOM OF CHOICE AND THE CLASS OF HYPER-
ARITHMETIC FUNCTIONS 
BY 
G. KREISEL*) 
(Communicated by Prof. A. HEYTING at the meeting of January 27, 1962) 
In sections 1 and 2 we give a simple new characterization of the class 
of hyperarithmetic functions (Theorem 2), and then we use the cor-
responding proof theoretic form to give a convenient formulation of 
elementary predicative analysis (EPA). The position with regard to 
predicativity is summarized in section 8. 
l. Let HYP mean hyperarithmetic, let R and S denote binary primitive 
recursive relations, a a number theoretic function variable of one 
argument, a 1 of two arguments, <i(n) (the number of) the sequence 
(a(O), ... , a(n-1)), <i1(m, ii) the sequence (a1(m, 0), ... , a1(m, n-1)). 
Theorem 1. 
( /\m)( V a)HYP( 1\n)R[<i(n), m] _,.. ( V al)HYP( 1\m)( l\n)R[&1(m, ii), m]. 
Lemma 1. If P(x, y) is II~ then 
( 1\m)( V n)P(m, n) -i>- ( V 'I])HYP( 1\m)P[m, 'l](m)]. 
Standard proof. Since P(m, n) is IIL there is a primitive recursive 
R(a, b, c) such that P(m, n) +--+ ( 1\fJ)( Vy)R[p(y), m, n]. For each pair m 
and n, consider the set O'm,n of sequences of R(a, m, n) which are not past-
secured, i.e. {(ao, ... ,as) : ( 1\r)[r<s -7-, R((ao, ... , ar), m, n)J}. Define 
n(x) as the n such that ( 1\{J)( V y)R[p(y), x, n ], and, for p < n, ax,p cannot 
be mapped into ax,n, and no O'x,p can be mapped into a proper section of 
ax,n (by an order-preserving mapping). This defines n(x) uniquely, and 
its graph is II~· Therefore n(x) is HYP. - The lemma is the obvious 
analogue to the case of!~ formulae P, when 1] can be chosen recursive. 
The ordinals of the unsecured sequences of II~ relations serve the same 
purpose as the w-orderings of the elements of a recursively enumerable set. 
To prove the theorem, observe: 
(1) For Kleene's 0, n E 0 is a II~ relation. 
(2) There is a primitive recursive H(n, m) such that, for each n E 0, 
( 1\m)H[n, &(m)] has a unique solution an which has the same recursive 
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degree as Kleene's HYP predicate Hn, and so every HYP function is 
recursive in some rxn, with n E 0. Let rx ~e fJ mean: rx is recursive in fJ 
by means of {e}. Then (/\m)(Vrx)HYP(;\n)R[&(n),m]->-(/\m)(Vn)(Vn') 
{n E 0 A ( /\rx)[( 1\y)H{n, &(y)}->- ( Ve)( /\{J)({e} is recursive A·{J ~e rx->-
->- ( 1\x)R[P(x), m] A {J(m) = n']}. 
The condition on the right hand side is of the form ( /\m)( V n)P(m, n) 
with P in ID · n' as a function of m gives the required 'YJ· 
Corollary 1. If the axiom of choice at lowest type (restricted to 
I~ formulae) is formulated in the form 
( /\m)( V rx)( 1\n)R[(&(n), m)]->- ( V rx1)( i\m)( i\n)R[&1(m, ii), m] 
then it is satisfied in the w-model whose functions are all the HYP 
functions. 
Corollary 2. If the HYP comprehension axiom is formulated in 
the form 
(Am){( V {J)( 1\n)R[P(n), m] ~ ( /\{J)( V n)S[P(n), m]}->-
->- ( V rx)( i\m)[rx(m) = 0 ~ ( V {J)( /\n)R[P(n), m] 
then the HYP comprehension axiom is satisfied in thew-model consisting 
of all HYP functions. This follows from 
Lemma 2. For any class C of number theoretic functions, the axiom of 
choice applied to I} formulae implies (classically) the HYP comprehension 
axiom, provided only C is closed under pairing and translation. 
For, {( V {J)( 1\n)R[P(n), m] ~ ( /\{J)( Vn)S[P(n), m]}->-
->- ( Vy){y=O->-( V {J)( 1\n)R[P(n),m] · A·yi=O->-( V {J)( i\n) --,S[P(n),m]},~ 
~ ( V y)( V {J)( !\ n1)( !\ n2){y = 0 ->- R[P(ni), m] ·A· y i= 0 ->- --, S[P(n2), m ]}. 
So, by the restricted axiom of choice (contracting the two existential 
quantifiers y and {J) 
( ;\m)( V y)( V {J)( ;\ n1)( !\ nz){y = 0->- R[P(n1), m] ·A· y i= 0->---, S[P(n2), m]}->-
->- ( V r;)( V {JI)( i\m ){r;(m) = 0->- ( !\ n)R[P1(m, ii), m] · "· r;(m) i= 0->-
->- ( /\n)--, S[pi(m,ii),m]}. 
But, since ( V {J1)( i\n)R[P1(m, ii), m]->---, ( V {J)( i\n)--, S[P(n), m] (by the 
assumed premise of the comprehension axiom) we have 
( Vr;)( /\m){r;(m)=O~ ( V {J)( 1\n)R[P(n), m]}. 
Note that the derivability of the general second order comprehension 
axiom from the axiom of choice 
( /\n)( Vy)Q(n, y)->- ( V r;)( 1\n)Q[n, r;(n)] 
for arbitrary second order formulae Q, is stated in section 1.5.1 of [7], 
and the special case above is stated in my supplement to [7]. 
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Corollary 3 . The fragment of analysis, which is proved consistent 
in [7], 12.3, by means of Brouwer's bar theorem, is satisfied by the class 
of HYP functions. 
To see this, observe that in [7], 12.3, the axiom of choice is formulated, 
with one or more parameters {3, in the form: 
( 1\m)( V a)( 1\n)R(m, n, a, {3)--+ ( V <XI)( 1\m)( 1\n)R'(m, n, <XI, {3), 
where R is primitive recursive in a and {3, and R' is (the primitive 
recursive relation) obtained from R by replacing A.ta(t) by A.tai(m, t). 
Now, if {30 is HYP, {30 is recursive in the uniquey which satisfies ( 1\p)B[y(p)] 
for a suitable primitive recursive B, and so there is an Ro such that 
( 1\n)R(m, n, a, f3o) +-+ ( Vy)( 1\n)( 1\p)Ro(m, n, a, y, p), +-+ 
+-+ ( Vy)HYP( 1\n)( 1\p)Ro(m, n, a, y, p). 
By Theorem 1 
( 1\m)( V tx)HYP( Vy)nYP( /\n)( 1\p)Ro(m, n, a, y, p)--+ 
--+ ( V <XI)HYP( Vyi)HYP( 1\m)( 1\n)( 1\p)Ro'(m, n, <XI, yr, p) 
and hence, by the equivalence above 
( 1\m)( V a)HYP( 1\n)R(m, n, a, f3o)--+ ( V <XI)HYP( 1\m)( 1\n)R'(m, n, <XI, f3o) 
as required. 
2. Theorem 2. HYP is the least (non-empty) class 0 of number 
theoretic functions satisfying the following conditions : 
(a) 0 is closed under recursive operations (and hence contains all 
recursive functions) 
(b) For each primitive recursive R 
( 1\m)( V a)c( 1\n)R[a(n), m]--+ ( V <XI)c( /\m)( 1\n)R[ai(m, ii), m]. 
By theorem I, HYP satisfies (a) and (b). To prove the existence of a least 
class, it is sufficient to show that every 0 which satisfies (a) and (b) 
includes HYP. (For the logical relation between this fact and known 
results, cf. the remark below.) 
Proof. Although we shall use the facts (I) and (2) above for the 
particular ordinal notations introduced by KLEENE, the proof only 
requires a few simple properties of these notations which are satisfied 
by other notations too. 
For n E 0, we consider two cases: 
(i) n is a successor ordinal, e.g., n = 2e: we have to show that if <Xe, 
introduced in (2) above, E 0, then also the characteristic function of the 
predicate ( V x)T[ ae(x), p, p ], where T is Kleene's T-predicate. Then 
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( 1\p)( Vy)( V q)( V <X)c( 1\m){H[e, <i(m)] A [T{<i(m), p, p}-
- y=O] A[-. T{[<i(q), p, p}- y= 1]} 
holds (with <X= <Xe). 
By condition (b), if y is replaced by 'fJ(p), 
'fJ(p)=O~ ( V x)T[<ie(x), p, p]. 
(ii) n is a limit ordinal, e.g. 3.5•, and we suppose that each <X{e}w> E G. 
Then ( 1\p)( V <X)c( 1\m)H[{e}(p), <i(m)] holds, with <X{e)<Pl, and so, by (b), 
we have an enumeration of the functions <X{e)<pl by means of a function 
in 0. 
Remark. The present characterization of HYP is simpler in form 
than KLEENE's characterization in [1] by means of the notion of basis, 
or my characterization as the least class which satisfies the HYP com-
prehension axiom [4]. By Lemma 2, which derives the HYP com-
prehension axiom from the restricted axiom of choice considered above, 
a class 0 satisfying (a) and (b), must include HYP. So the proof above 
could have been omitted by reference to Proposition 0 of [ 4 ]. 
3. Predicativity. The arguments above use uncritically an im-
predicative function quantifier. Therefore, as emphasized in [5], p. 373, 
footnote 6 and pp. 387-388, they are not sufficient to establish by them-
selves predicative results of a positive kind. But they suggest a thoroughly 
predicative approach, just as recursion theory, which uses a classical 
existential quantifier, has suggested thoroughly constructive, i.e., finitist, 
results. ~ We shall make a fresh start. 
A predicative definition of a set (say, of natural numbers) is required 
to use quantification only over 'previously defined' totalities; the set of 
natural numbers themselves is supposed to be given, or the notion of 
'finite' is supposed to be well-defined. The traditional way of making the 
idea of a predicative definition explicit is by introducing a ramified 
hierarchy, such as described in detail (but by the use of the notion of 
constructive ordinal, which is itself impredicative) in [1], for finite levels 
with explicit rules of proof in [6], and sketched on a predicative basis 
in [3], section 5. The use of a ramified theory for the foundations of 
classical analysis was specially emphasized by HERMANN WEYL [8]. 
Ramified analysis has two complementary defects. Given a statement A 
of impredicative analysis, let A a denote its relativization to sets of level a, 
i.e., the set variables in A are interpreted to range over the sets of level a 
and not over all sets. Then the universal quantifier is weakened, the 
existential quantifier is strengthened, and, for different A, the logical 
relations between A and Aa are different. In short, the content of A is 
lost in stepping to Aa. Also, for a# a', the logical relations between Aa 
and Aa, are complicated. - The second defect is that this apparent 
complication is quite gratuitous. For, in actual practice, the translation 
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of theorems A of elementary classical analysis (including the basic theory of 
Lebesgue measure) into Aa is practically uniform in a, when the translation 
is valid at all. 
This uniformity is generally recognized. The only problem is to find 
a useful way of formulating it. A model theoretic way was given by 
KoNDO [2] and in my [5], where, for a given A, the closure conditions 
are analysed that have to be satisfied by a class 0 of sets for Acto hold. 
In particular cases, such as the Reine-Borel theorem, as in [5], or results 
on Lebesgue measure, as in the review of [2] for Math. Revs., the closure 
conditions are so simple that they are easily recognized to be predicative, 
[5], footnote 6 1). But, from the point of view of a systematic predicative 
foundation, this formulation is defective [cf. [5], p. 387 (b)]. It gives 
no hint of which hyperarithmetic operations are predicatively acceptable. 
Also, given a classical proof one has to analyse it ad hoc to see what 
closure conditions are involved. 
4. The natural way of (i) avoiding both the defects of a formulation 
in terms of ramified analysis and in terms of closure under HYP operations 
and (ii) retaining their advantages, is to find a convenient set of axiomB 
for second or higher order arithmetic which are valid both when the variables 
of higher type (in the sense of the simple theory of types) are interpreted 
as ranging over all sets (of the type considered) and when they are inter-
preted as ranging over predicative sets. In particular, theorems proved in 
this way will be valid in each model closed under HYP operations. 
The function of such a set of axioms is somewhat analogous to that of 
the axioms for a real closed field in the study of real algebra. When a 
theorem is proved from these axioms it is not only valid for the set of all 
real numbers (an impredicative notion), but also, e.g., for the predicatively 
introduced set of all algebraic real numbers. The important difference 
between the theory of real closed fields and the projected axiom system 
is this: since (in the notation chosen) a statement is true in one real closed 
field if and only if it is true in all of them, the choice of axioms is intrinsic; 
since there are primitive recursive R 0 for which ( /\x)Ro[<i(x)] is satisfied 
1 ) If one does not understand the notion "predicative" (or simply prefers a 
more formal approach) one would have to say that the statements are uniformly 
valid for all levels of the ramified hierarchy. The informal definition of "predicative" 
in the text is needed, and not that of [9], p. 37, based on the vicious circle principle: 
If, provided a certain collection had a total, it would have members only definable 
in terms of that total, then the said collection has no total. Note that this formu-
lation would permit the property of being-a-member-of-the-total to be definable 
only in terms of that total; thus, taken literally, e.g. no collection of natural 
numbers or of rationals would be excluded. It is not surprising that the formulation 
in [9] is so weak; its principal aim was to exclude the paradoxes of the theory of 
classes. Since they are also excluded by the impredicative (unramified) theory of 
types, the quite crude property of predicativity above can be expected to achieve 
this aim too (when made precise). In analysis the stricter condition, which is also 
true for the intuitive notion of predicativity, must be used. 
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by some function, but by no HYP function 2), there are statements in 
second order notation which are true for all predicative sets, but not 
for all sets. Our present 3) criterion of success in the choice of our axioms 
is empirical: whether it covers in a natural way those proofs of working 
analysts which permit a predicative interpretation. 
It may be remarked that there are (completely) type-free foundations 
for parts of analysis, e.g. in [6], based on previous work by AcKERMANN. 
Here the rules of propositional logic are restricted, and the comprehension 
axiom is unrestricted. I have discussed this system in my review of [6] 
for the JSL. Despite the interesting features of the system, it seems fair 
to say that it would not have been introduced as a foundation of analysis, 
if the adequacy of the simple formalization presented in the next paragraph 
had been realized. It is, perhaps, no accident that predicatively biassed 
logicians have failed to notice this simple approach: (i) since, for them, 
the notion of an arbitrary set of natural numbers is unacceptable, it is 
of no interest to them that a theorem holds for all such sets of natural 
numbers; (ii) the use of the axiomatic method is misunderstood to be 
necessarily a 'formalistic' device, while, in fact, it is much more usual 
to give axioms which are valid for some intuitive conception (as below). 
5. A formal system EPA (elementary predicative analysis). We 
consider ordinary (classical) predicate logic of finite order, of course, 
without comprehension axioms, the constants 0 and' (successor), successor 
and equality axioms, and the schema of induction applied to arbitrary 
formulae in this notation. The substitution rule for function variables is 
applied only to terms txA(x) where A(x) is of first order (but may contain 
free variables). 
On the basis of these axioms, the notion of (a canonical representation 
of) a primitive recursive relation R is introduced, and the following 
inference schema is formulated (cf. section l, corollary 3): 
For each R(n, m, IX, {3) let R'(n, m, lXI, {3) be (the primitive recursive 
relation) obtained by replacing A.t~X(t) in R by A.t~X1 (m, t). Then, infer 
(V lXI)( 1\m)( 1\n)R'(n, m, lXI, {3) from ( 1\m)(V ~X)( 1\n)R(n, m, IX, {3). 
EPA- is the system obtained from EPA if the inference schema is 
restricted to R without additional parameters {3. In this case the schema 
is equivalent to the schema: for each primitive recursive relation R of 
2) We can prove, e.g. in ramified analysis of level a + I, that no ex" satisfies 
( ;\ x)Ro[Ci"(x} ]. 
3) As emphasized in [3], it is possible (cf. section 7 below) that there is a 
recursively enumerable set of axioms which yields exactly the predicatively provable 
theorems in, e.g., second order notation. Once such a set is available, the problem 
of finding a set of axioms which yields all theorems in this notation which are valid 
both under the predicative and under the impredicative interpretation, ceases to 
be a purely empirical matter. 
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the two numerical variables n and m, infer 
( V cx1)( 1\m)( !\n)R[&1(m, ii), m] from ( 1\m)( Vex)( 1\n)R[&(n), m]. 
Note that for the formulae considered in the inference schema the 
predicative interpretation is stronger than the impredicative one. 
Justification of EPA (a) The predicative justification of EPA is this. 
The only doubtful element is the inference schema. If it has been pre-
dicatively established that, for all predicatively defined objects denoted 
by the free variables in R(n, m), and each m, an cxm is obtained by means 
of (predicative) operations applied to these objects, which satisfies 
( 1\n)R[&m(n), m], then this sequence can be predicatively enumerated 4). 
Alternatively, one uses a ramified hierarchy and the enumeration of the 
objects of level a by a function at a+ 1. 
(b) Impredicatively, the comprehension axiom is, perhaps, even more 
evident than the axiom of choice. However, the particular case of the 
axiom of choice 
( 1\m)( Vex)( 1\n)R[&(n), m] -r ( V a1)( 1\m)( 1\n)R[&l(m, ii), m] 
can be derived (of course, without use of the axiom of choice) by means 
of the comprehension axiom applied to Boolean combinations of !i 
formulae, cf. e.g., footnote 18 of [7]. - Note that this "justification" is 
useless from a predicative point of view: by Theorem 1 the conclusion 
holds when relativized to HYP functions, and, by footnote 23 on p. 384 
of [5], the comprehension schema applied to !i formulae does not. 
Remark. By Lemma 2 above, from our inference schema we obtain 
as a "derived" rule: from 
infer 
( 1\m){( V {J)( 1\n)R({J, n, m, y) ~ ( 1\(J)( V n)S({J, n, m, y)} 
(Vex)( 1\m){cx(m) = o~ ( V (J)( 1\n)R({J, n, m, y)}. 
Thus, this inference is also covered by justification (a) above. However, 
it is, perhaps, of interest to give a more direct justification. A predicative 
proof of the premise shows this: if y denotes the set of free variables in 
R, there will be a least class WC(y) which contains (the objects denoted by) 
y and is closed with respect to the (predicative) operations introduced 
in the proof, and every class C£(y) satisfying these conditions satisfies the 
4) This argument seems to justify only the rule of EPA, not the axiom of choice 
itself (applied to ~i formulae). For, the interpretation of the logical constants, 
in particular of --+, is classical; but the argument does not merely suppose that, 
for each m, (V1X) (fln)R[&(n), m] is true (for some predicative 1X), but that this 
fact has been predicatively established. For this reason it seemed of interest to 
justify the HYP comprehension axiom independently in the Remark below. 'Ve 
leave open whether the addition of the restricted axiom of choice to EPA is 
conservative (say, for ~i formulae). 
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axioms used in the proof. But this means, by [5], p. 379, para. 2, that, 
for every (£ :J WC(y), 
( V (J)fl( 1\ n)R((J, n, m, y) +---+ ( V fJ)m(yJ( 1\ n)R((J, n, m, y), 
and so eX is predicatively defined too (by quantification over WC(y) which 
is a set "previously introduced"). In particular, the extension of the 
set defined by ( V (J)( 1\n)R((J, n, m, y) is independent of the exact range 
of the quantifier (J; this is typical of bound predicative set variables 
when used for the definition of sets; cf. [5], pp. 378-380. - EPAO denotes 
the system obtained from EPA when the inference schema is replaced 
by the derived rule above. 
6. Formalization of the theory of a real variable. It would be in-
teresting to have available a development of some basic parts of this 
theory in EPA, and (more interesting and more difficult) proofs that 
other parts do not hold in EPA; e.g. it is clear that the usual theory of 
open and closed sets can be developed in EPA (cf. [5], 382-383), while 
the more refined structure theory of closed sets, e.g. the theorem of 
Cantor-Bendixson, cannot (cf. [5], section 5) be developed in EPA or 
its extensions, described in the next section. The theory of Lebesgue 
measure can also largely be developed in EPA; for though the reference 
to arbitrary measurable sets of real numbers gives it an air of great 
generality, each such set and its complement can be approximated by 
G6 sets, and the operations on measurable sets are in fact operations on 
these G6 5). 
As an example, consider the theorem that, if each set of real numbers 
Ap is L-measurable then nAp is measurable. (All sets considered are 
subsets of [0, 1 ]. ) P 
Definitions. An open set G is determined by a function Qm (of the 
integral variable m) whose values are open rational intervals such that: 
~ E G+-+ ( V m)(~ E Qm). 
A set A is measurable if there exist two functions Qn,m and Rn,m (whose 
values are open rational intervals or, equivalently, functions G1 ,n and 
G2,n whose values are open sets) such that, for each n, 
A C U Qn,m, CA C U Rn,m, L IQn,ml + L IRn,ml < 1 + 1/n, 
m m m m 
where CA denotes the complement of A with respect to [0, 1]. (Equiv-
alently, there exist two G6 sets H1 and H2 such that A C Hr, CA C H2, 
IHll + IH21 = 1.) 
A sequence Ap is measurable if there exist two functions Q~.m and 
S) The ideas needed are, of course, familiar since (cf. [5] p. 383, lines 13-20) 
the founders of the theory of measure were predicatively orientated. Unfortunately 
the predicatively biassed logicians such as KoNDo, LORENZEN, or WEYL do not 
list the principles of proof used, and so there is no hope of a systematic (wholesale) 
translation of their work into EPA. 
315 
R~.m (of three variables) such that, if 
Gf,,.= U ~.m• G~.,.= U ~.m• !Gf,,.I+IG~,,.I<1+1fn, and 
m m Ap C Gf.,. and CAp C G~.,.. 
Note. Without the axiom of choice this condition is not derivable 
from: for each p, Ap is measurable. - For the formalization of practical 
analysis this difference does not appear serious, at least in the following 
context. General theorems allow one to step from the measurability of a 
sequence Ap to the measurability of a set B obtained by applying an 
operation Q to the sequence; then specific sets, obtained by means of Q, 
are proved to be measurable. If the axiom of choice is available, one has 
to verify only that the particular Ap used in the construction are measur-
able; now one has to show that the sequences are measurable in the sense 
above. For most of the basic results this seems to present no additional 
work. It would be interesting to discover exceptions. 
Given that the sequence Ap is measurable, i.e., functions Q~.m and R~.m, 
to define sequences Fnl and Fn2 of open sets such that 
nAp c Fn1, en Ap = u CAp c Fn2; 1Fn1l +1Fn2l < 1+ 1/n. 
p p p 
To formalize this in EPA, Fnl and Fn2 are defined by number theoretic 
quantification applied to expressions (primitive) recursive in the functions 
Q and R; in other words, one uses only the arithmetic comprehension 
axiom with free function variables (the proof that the functions so defined 
satisfy the conditions above, follows verbatim the standard texts since, 
in contrast to a ramified foundation, we do not have to assign levels to 
the real number variables which occur in ordinary mathematics). 
The details below are standard. First, define arithmetically (e.g., by 
[5] p. 382) ft(p, n) such that 
1 ~ IQ:,ml < n·5P 
m>p(p,n) 
[i.e. approximation of GnP by finite sets of rational intervals to accuracy 
(n·5P)-1]. Denoting 
U Q:.m by flf.n• the closure of Q by Q, and U Q~.m by Ff.n 
m>p 
we have, for each n, 
nAp C n Ff ... + U flf .... 
Since, by definition, lgf.nl < (n· 5P)-1, ~ igf.,.! < (4n)-1. For each n, n Ff ... 
p 
is closed, and covered by an open set G,.s, defined arithmetically uni-
fromly in n, such that IGn31 differs from the measure 6) of n Ff.n by 
p 
6) The reference to a (numerical) measure is harmless since it could be 
paraphrased; in any case, by [5], p. 383, Remarque, the measure of the sets 
involved is itself arithmetically definable. 
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< (4n)-1. Let 
Fnl=Ga+UgP n l,n 
p 
To define Fn2, note that l~.nl exceeds the measure of CAP by < n-1 
so that I UR~.aP,ml exceeds the measure of CAP by < (3P·n)-1 . Hence, if 
m 
P m 
c nAp c Fn2, IFn1l +IFn2l < 1 + 1/n, 
p 
as required (the proof is omitted for the reasons stated above). 
Corollary (cf. review of [2] in Math. Revs.). If the sequences of 
"covering" intervals Q~.m and R~.m for Ap, CAP are definable at level a of 
the ramified hierarchy then so is the measure of (I Ap and coverings of 
(I Ap and C (I Ap. p 
p p 
It is apparent that only a small part of EPA is used; the inference 
rule is applied to arithmetic formulae only. This is an example of a general 
phenomenon: in the portions of analysis developed by working mathe-
maticians, a theorem is either derivable by means of the arithmetic 
comprehension axiom or else not predicative at all (not even true when 
relativized to HYP functions). Similarly in arithmetic, the great majority 
of theorems are either derivable in primitive recursive arithmetic or else 
not constructive (not recursively satisfiable). It would be interesting 
to list exceptions. - Here we mean theorems concerning special functions; 
e.g. if Rn(m) is an enumeration of primitive recursive relations 
( V !ex)( 1\x){~X(x) < 1 A Rn[ii(x)]} ~ ( V 1X)REc( 1\x){~X(x) < 1 A Rn[ii(x)]} 
( V !~X)( 1\x)Rn[ii(x)] ~ ( V 1X)HYP( 1\x)Rn[ii(x)] 
hold, but REC and HYP cannot be replaced by subclasses. 
Remark. The interest (to the "ordinary" analyst) of developing 
(parts of) analysis in EPA or its extensions below, instead of using the 
full comprehension axiom, is simply this: a theorem so proved when 
relativized applies to interesting subclasses of the class of real numbers; 
this increased generality is discussed in [2], [5] pp. 374-375, or sections 
3 and 4 above. Its interest is independent of the rejection of impredicative 
methods. - As is to be expected, many elementary proofs in analysis 
provide more information than mere formalizability in EPA: e.g. the 
results satisfy the forme renforcee of [5] p. 381, but not all theorems of 
EPA do. Consider an enumeration Rp(n) of all primitive recursive relations 
and let Ap(1X) denote ( 1\n)Rp[ii(n)]. Then 
( 1\p)( v IX)( v {J)( 1\y)( !\b){-, Ap(y) v [ Ap(1X) A • Ap(b) ~ 
~ 1X = !5] v [Ap(1X) AAp({J) A/X# {J]} 
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is provable logically 7), but its forme renforcee is false: the latter requires 
that, for each p, there exist distinct HYP ex and fJ which satisfy Ap if Ap 
is satisfied by any distinct functions. This is not true, e.g., if Ap is satisfied 
by some function, but not by any HYP function. 
7. Extensions of EPA; their relation to ramified analysis. FEFERM:AN 
(cf. an abstract to appear soon in the Notices of the Amer. Math. Soc.) 
has extended EPA by iterated application of (a) formalized infinite 
induction and (b) non-constructive infinite induction, i.e., by adding 
new axioms without altering the notation (and thus avoiding the basic 
defects of ramified analysis, stressed in section 3 above). The extension 
procedure is of course impredicatively valid. To ensure predicativity, the 
iteration is restricted to ordinals ex which can be recognized to be ordinals 
by < ex iterations, called "autonomous": (a) is used for positive results, 
(b) for negative ones (impossibility assertions). FEFERMAN has obtained 
i.a. the following striking results: 
Let x"0 =w", X"9 =exth ordinal which is a critical X~-' number for all p,<v. 
Let Yv= x~, and let F be the first critical y-number. Then 
r is the l.u.b. of the autonomous ordinals obtained from EPA either by (a) 
or by (b), and the same is true for EPAO in place of EPA. 
He has also shown that EPA- is equivalent (w.r.t. JD statements) to 
the ramified hierarchy of finite levels studied in [6], EPAO and EPA to 
the hierarchy with levels < ww, and, most important, 
the autonomous progressions starting with either EPA o or EPA and based 
on either (a) or on (b) are equivalent to the ramified hierarchy of < r levels 
(ScnfrTTE had obtained independently that, for each canonical ordering 
of type ex, ex< r, the ordering can be proved to be a well ordering at 
some level fJ <ex, and r is optimal). 
These results execute two alternative proposals for characterizing the 
predicative ordinals; a strict version in [3], section 5 (where, however, 
the procedure at limit ordinals was not properly formulated) on the 
basis of the ramified hierarchy, and a wider one in terms of the autono-
mous (non-constructive) w-rule [5] p. 387(b). The work of FEFERM:AN 
and ScnfrTTE not only describes the predicative ordinals explicitly, but 
shows that the two proposals are equivalent (when precisely formulated). 
It may be remarked that the bound r is not affected even if one uses 
infinite formulae, suggested in [5] p. 387 (b), if (roughly) one imposes the 
natural restrictions: any formula used at stage ex, regarded as a transfinite 
sequence of (Godel numbers of) primitive symbols must be a set in a 
7 ) On the basis of the two·valued interpretation. As noted in [4], pp. 138-139, 
the intuitionistic formalism might be useful in this connection, but the logical 
constants would be interpreted along the lines of [4], section 6, and not in the 
manner of HEYTING. 
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system {J, {J <IX, and the "truth table" of any propositional function 
introduced at stage IX must also be such a set. These facts support the 
proposition that F i8 for predicative mathematiC8 what Eo iB for finiti8t 
mathematiCB. 
Remark. In view of this the significance for predicativity of results 
on hyperarithmetic sets such as in [1], [4], [5] or, e.g., the present note, 
can be stated as follows. In these papers one considered some property 
evidently possessed by the notion of predicative set, and found that the 
intersection of all classes of sets (in the impredicative sense) with this 
property was: HYP. Of course, it was not (and could not be) claimed 
that all of HYP was predicatively obtainable: [1] made no claim and 
[5] had explicit reservations, e.g. footnote 6 on p. 373 or pp. 387-388. 
Using the results of ScHUTTE and FEFERMAN one can say: if one considers 
the inductive generation of the "least" class of sets with the property 
considered, one does not get the whole of HYP unless one iterates. the 
inductive principle beyond the first impredicative ordinal, namely r B). 
[One distinguishes of course between (a) orderings that are predicatively 
recognized to be well orderings, (b) predicatively defined orderings which 
happen to be well orderings. Following an excellent terminological 
suggestion of BERNAYS, we propose to call (a): predicative ordinals or 
predicatively well founded orderings (all of type <F), and (b): well 
founded predicative orderings ( < w1). The same device applies with 
"constructive" in place of "predicative".] 
8. Conclusion. The recent contributions on predicativity in [1 ], 
[3], [5] and above may be summarized as follows. (a) They are primarily 
8 ) Classical predicative mathematics, as formulated above, is included (via the 
usual translation) in intuitionistic mathematics (cf. [5], pp. 388-390). More 
formally: the consistency of EPA and its autonomous extensions, in fact of the 
axiom of choice applied to I~ formulae instead of the rule of EPA, has been proved 
by means of Brouwer's own bar theorem ([7], para. 12.3). Intuitively speaking, 
this principle asserts essentially the possibility of proof by generalized induction 
and of definitions of functions and functionals on an inductively generated species. 
One may certainly expect to get an "effective", even recursive computation 
procedure for such functions and the representing functions of such functionals 
(cf. [4] p. 125); but for an intuitionistic definition, we have to have a proof that 
the procedure terminates. For such a proof it may be necessary to have the 
primitive notion of a constructive operation of higher type or of a proof considered 
as an operation on abstract objects (Brouwer's: inluiltliche Beweisjuhrung, which 
may be transfinite), not "ultimately reducible" to the notion of natural number, 
achieved by Feferman's or Schutte's autonomous progressions. Briefly, to recognize 
that a given procedure is a welldefined construction, one may already have to have 
the general notion of construction (similarly in classical mathematics: a formula 
with quantifiers over sets will in general define a set uniquely only if one already 
knows the extension of set, except that in the intuitionistic case it is never a matter 
of the extension). This is an impredicativity, but constructive, provided, of course, 
one understands the notion involved. 
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concerned with predicativity relative to the notion of natural number, 
i.e., with that part of mathematics which is reducible to the notion of 
natural number. In particular, in the context of an unramified second 
order theory, it is that part of the theory of real numbers which is 
understood if the notion of natural number is understood (whereas the 
full theory presupposes in addition the notion of set of natural numbers). 
It is to be noted that we deal with reduction to the meaning of and not, 
e.g., to some formal system (for a fragment) of the notion of natural 
number: thus the system EPA can, of course, not be proved in EPA to 
be consistent relative to first order arithmetic. (b) The ramified hierarchy, 
sketched in [3], is the appropriate tool for a precise definition of what 
is meant by reduction in sense (a). The hierarchies of [l] or [5], which 
go up to co~, do not provide such reductions. For, since the range of the 
quantifiers of level a is well defined only if a is an ordinal, the hierarchies 
up to co1 use as a means of reduction not only the concept of natural 
number, but also the (impredicative) concept of well founded predicative or-
dering (cf. section 7). (c) For the use ofpredicative analysis in mathematical 
practice, FEFERMAN's hierarchy in section 7, based on EPA, is preferable 
to ramified hierarchies for the reasons set out at length in sections 3, 
4 and 6 above. It appears that predicative analysis consitutes also a 
mathematically fruitful subdomain of analysis, leading to a new kind of 
generalization of basic theorems in analysis and the theory of sets of 
points. 
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